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We examine fees on bonds issued by Japanese corporations during the 1994-2002 
period. We relate fees to firms’ membership of bank-led (financial) keiretsu. For 
the full sample of firms, we establish a positive relation between fees and risk 
factors. Over time, we find that fees have increased for those firms that are related 
to financial keiretsu, even after controlling for risk factors. But during the same 
period, fees have fallen for firms not belonging to keiretsu. It seems that, against 
the background of bond market deregulation and weaker banks, keiretsu 
membership has become a burden rather than an advantage. 
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1. Introduction 
During the 1980s and 1990s Japanese corporate bond markets were increasingly deregulated, 
opening up the markets to both more issuers and more underwriters. Notable events were the 
admission of foreign and commercial banks to the bond underwriting market in 1993, and the 
deregulation of underwriting fees and relaxation of eligibility guidelines for issuers in 1994.1 
As a result, there was a sharp decline in underwriting fees from 1.5% of proceeds in 1991 to 
0.35-0.55% in 1995.2 Another consequence of the reforms was increased access to public 
finance, which was especially useful for those firms not belonging to financial keiretsu. Until 
then keiretsu membership had meant better access to finance and insurance against failure 
(Sheard, 1989, Hoshi et al., 1991). But in the 1990s, the banks at the core of these financial 
keiretsu increasingly got into trouble and could no longer guarantee bail-out to its member 
firms.  
 
Against the background of bond market deregulation and the weakening of the position of 
banks, we examine fees on bond issues by Japanese corporations during the 1994-2002 
period, to investigate the effects of keiretsu affiliation. Our focus is on bonds, because they 
are closely linked to the bankruptcy costs that are supposed to be lower for keiretsu firms (e.g. 
Hoshi et al., 1990). Moreover, they were the most important source of public finance for 
Japanese firms in the 1990s. Over the 1993-1999 period, Japanese firms issued for Yen 70.6 
trillion in bonds against Yen 15.4 trillion in equity.3 To our knowledge, the relation between 
fees and keiretsu affiliation has not been investigated in earlier studies.  
 
                                                
1
 Financial Institution Reform Act, passed in June 1992, effective in April 1993. 
2
 Finance and Fiscal Affairs (Kinyu Zaisei Jijyou), December 1995 
3
 Japan Securities Dealers Association, Factbook 2003. 
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As in previous research on fees (e.g. Kim et al., 2003), we find that fees, also referred to as 
spreads, increase in issue risk at the individual issue level. More importantly, we find that fees 
have risen over time for members of financial keiretsu, while they have fallen for non-
affiliated firms. This relation holds after controlling for risk factors. We see these rising fees 
as evidence that the costs of keiretsu membership have come to outweigh the benefits. Bank-
lead corporate groups may have been an efficient solution to missing markets for public 
finance. But their success declined as the banks at their core suffered from the combined 
effects of deregulation and the 1990 burst of the financial bubble. Because banks could no 
longer guarantee bail-out to their member firms, the advantage of reduced bankruptcy costs 
diminished. Moreover, the disadvantages of being affiliated increased as the problems of 
keiretsu banks spilled over to affiliated firms. For example, Horiuchi and Shimizu (1998) 
report substantial placements of subordinated debt with affiliated firms, and Weinstein and 
Yafeh (1998) find higher costs of capital for keiretsu firms. Our results suggest that these 
spillovers also included higher fees on corporate bonds. 
 
The next section first discusses the features of financial keiretsu, then continues with the 
parallel developments of financial market deregulation and the weakening of banks, and 
finally discusses the literature on underwriting fees. Sections 3 and 4 present data and results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature and hypotheses 
We start this section with a description of financial keiretsu and their advantages and 
disadvantages. Subsequently, we discuss how two simultaneous developments, namely bond 
market deregulation and feeble banks, have weakened the keiretsu system. Finally, we will 




The Japanese versions of corporate groups are called keiretsu, and they come in two types. 
Vertical keiretsu are centered around a manufacturing firm and have an industry focus, 
whereas financial or horizontal keiretsu are centered around a large bank, and are active in 
many industries. These financial keiretsu will be the focus of our analysis. In the remainder of 
the paper we refer to financial keiretsu simply as keiretsu. Banks, although not allowed to 
own more than 5% of shares in a firm, are the most powerful players in the keiretsu. They 
yield their influence through cross-shareholdings, interlocking directorships and a Presidents’ 
council where the keiretsu’s most important firms meet. Moreover, the banks use their 
creditor rights to take full control in distressed group firms. Keiretsu advantages and 
disadvantages have been very well documented in the literature.  
 
A major advantage of the keiretsu system is its ability to solve information problems. For 
example, the keiretsu's main bank is argued to be both a superior monitor and a potential 
intervention agent (e.g., Sheard, 1989). Aoki (1990) emphasizes that the very threat of a bank 
takeover also plays an important monitoring role. In a similar vein, Berglöf and Perotti (1994) 
claim that the cross-holdings of debt and equity within keiretsu act as a coalition-enforced 
threat of removal from control. Moreover, Hoshi et al. (1990) argue that keiretsu reduce 
bankruptcy costs by easier renegotiation and better access to capital. They find that after the 
onset of distress, affiliated firms invest more and sell more than non-affiliated firms. Main 
banks implicitly guarantee the loans made to their affiliated firms by other banks and 
voluntarily take more than their share of the losses in case of distress (Aoki, 1988, and Hoshi 
et al., 1990). Furthermore, since the main bank implicitly guarantees to bail out distressed 
members, affiliation can be seen as a form of insurance against bankruptcy (Sheard, 1989). 
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A flaw of the system is the potential for rent-seeking behavior, consistent with Rajan's (1992) 
hold-up model. Rent-seeking includes demanding too high interest rates and distorting 
investment decisions toward projects with low risk, high collateral and high leverage. Morck 
and Nakamura (1999), and Morck et al. (2000) find evidence of such rent-seeking behavior 
by banks. The distortion of investment decisions is also noted by Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) 
who find that keiretsu firms are both larger and more levered. Under bank influence, they 
produce more than optimal for value maximization. As a result, they are larger than their 
efficient size. Moreover, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) find that affiliated firms are less 
profitable and have higher costs of capital. The lower profitability of keiretsu firms has also 
been found by Prowse (1992) and Kang and Shivdasani (1999). Nakatani (1984) argues that 
this lower profitability is offset by lower risk and more stable cash flows, but Beason (1998) 
does not find any support for this argument: although affiliated firms indeed perform worse, 
they do not have lower share price volatility. 
 
Several observations indicate that the costs of keiretsu membership began to outweigh the 
benefits by the 1990s. First, over the past decade there has been a continuous dissolution of 
cross-holdings (‘Cross-shareholdings decline for the 11th straight year’, NLI Research 
Institute, January 2002). Second, as previously mentioned, keiretsu members perform worse 
than non-affiliated firms. Third, as we will argue in the next subsection, since the banks are in 
a state of crisis themselves, they can no longer perform their intervention function properly. 
Fourth, as we will show in section 2.3, bond market access has improved, thus reducing the 
need to be a keiretsu member to have access to public finance.  
 
2.2 Weaker banks 
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With the burst of the stock market and real estate bubble in 1990, Japanese banks were left 
with a vast portfolio of non-performing corporate and property loans. Moreover, their reserves 
declined due to the depressed equity prices. Profits fell, the bad loans grew worse and the first 
banks began to fall. There had not been a single bank failure since World War II, but from 
late 1994 to mid 1996, eight banks failed (Financial Times, 19 July 1996). The banking crisis 
was highlighted in late 1997, when Japanese banks were even paying up to half a percentage 
point above the LIBOR, the so-called “Japanese premium”. The convoy policy, in which the 
government ordered strong banks to help their weaker competitors, only worsened the 
problems (see e.g. Bremer and Pettway, 2002). In 1999 there was a wave of merger 
announcements among banks, most of them becoming effective in 2001. Seven out of eight 
core keiretsu banks were involved in mergers among themselves, leaving eight keiretsu with 
only four main banks4. In the meantime, the banks’ problems spilled over to firms with close 
banking ties. For example, banks managed to substantially mitigate the shortfall in equity 
capital by issuing subordinated debt which was largely placed with affiliated firms (Horiuchi 
and Shimizu, 1998). In addition, Kang and Stulz (2000) report that exogenous shocks to banks 
during Basle negotiations resulted in negative spillovers to bank clients, as they find that 
Japanese firms with more bank loans in 1989 performed worse in the 1990-1993 period. Thus, 
the close banking ties inherent to keiretsu affiliation have become much less appealing. An 
interesting example is the Fuyo keiretsu, where bad performance and a weak financial core 
resulted in the failure or sale of several important group members in late 1997 and early 1998, 
                                                
4
 In 1999 Fuji Bank (Fuyo), Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank (DKB), and the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) announced to 
form the Mizuho financial group. In the same year, Sakura Bank (Mitsui) and Sumitomo Bank decided to 
become the Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, while Sanwa Bank and Tokai Bank teamed up to be United 
Financial of Japan (UFJ). As a result, now only four main banks remain for eight keiretsu. This may even be 
reduced to three banks as the troubled UFJ is about to be taken over by Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial. 
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including Showa Line, Nihon Cement, Toa Steel, and the broker Yamaichi (‘Inside the Fuyo 
keiretsu’, Financial Times, 28 October 1998). 
 
2.3 Bond market development 
The Japanese bond markets were heavily regulated until the end of the 1970s, with limited 
access for both potential underwriters and firms wanting to issue bonds. For issuers, very 
strict eligibility prevailed, which ensured that only three firms could issue unsecured bonds in 
1979. In addition, until 1993 there were caps to the amount that could be issued. Moreover, 
issuance required the involvement of a bond issuance committee ('kisaikai') dominated by 
banks, which resulted in a strong bargaining position for banks and high issuance costs, as the 
principal management bank charged fees that totaled 2-3% of the bond’s principal (Yasuda, 
2001). However, in 1988 the kisaikai was abolished. As to the eligibility guidelines, they were 
gradually loosened so that by 1989 they were met by over 300 firms (Hoshi et al., 1993) and 
by approximately 500 firms in April 1993. Later, the lowest credit rating of companies 
eligible to issue unsecured bonds was lowered from A to BBB and the number of firms 
eligible to issue uncollateralized bonds increased to approximately 800 (Financial Times, 1 
June 1995). Eventually, speculative grade firms were allowed to issue as well. Hoshi et al., 
1993 show that this resulted in a shift from bank to public debt. Many firms that used to issue 
in the Eurobond market and many more firms that previously did not issue at all, began to 
issue in the domestic bond market during the late eighties and nineties. The amount of 
corporate bonds outstanding almost doubled from 1993 to 2002 (Japan Securities Dealers 
Association, Fact Book 2003), in spite of the deterioration in the financial condition of both 
issuers and banks by 1996 (Schena, 2002). As access to finance was one of the main 
advantages of the keiretsu system, the increased issuer access is likely to have made keiretsu 
affiliation less attractive. 
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Entry into the market for underwriter services was limited too. During the 1980s and the early 
1990s, the Japanese Big Four investment banks (Nomura, Yamaichi, Nikko, and Daiwa) 
dominated the market with over 95% market share5. But in April 1993 the Financial System 
Reform Law became effective which gradually allowed foreign and commercial banks to 
underwrite bond issues. The result was that Japanese commercial banks took a large part of 
the bond underwriting market: the market share in corporate bond underwriting of the Big 
Four fell from 89% in 1994 to 62% in 1996 (The Nikkei Weekly, 14 April 1997). Nomura 
eventually recovered, but Nikko was sold to Citigroup and Yamaichi even failed in November 
1997. Another result was that fees paid to underwriters fell from 1.5% in 1991 to 0.35-0.55% 




When investment banks underwrite securities, they charge substantial fees to the issuer. Fees 
are usually defined as a percentage of proceeds. On a $1 billion bond issue, underwriters can 
easily charge 1% or $10 million in fees. In spite of their economic significance, fees have 
received limited attention in the literature. Fees partly reflect the amount of effort investment 
bankers put into the underwriting process. In addition, fees are a compensation for the risk the 
underwriter is exposed to. That is, the underwriter's position can be described as a short 
position in a put option (Smith, 1977). The risk exists both in terms of direct cash flow 
consequences and in terms of potential loss of reputation and future market share. 
Accordingly, Kim et al. (2003) find issue and firm characteristics, such as leverage, rating and 
maturity to be the main explanatory variables for fees on US bond issues.  
                                                
5
 SDC league tables 
6
 Finance and Fiscal Affairs (Kinyu Zaisei Jijyou), December 1995 
 10 
 
In other studies, fees have mainly been related to competition among underwriters, with 
underwriting fees found to decrease as competition increases. For example, Carow (1999) 
finds for various US securities markets that fees fall as innovative securities become 
mainstream. And for corporate debt markets specifically, fees have diminished with 
commercial bank entry in the US (Gande, et al., 1999) and with the Euro introduction for 
Eurobond markets (Santos and Tsatsaronis, 2003). When competition is frustrated by 
collusion of underwriters, fees remain high, as found for the US equity IPO market (Chen and 
Ritter, 2000).  
 
Fees also depend on underwriter characteristics. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) show that 
high reputation investment banks can charge higher fees than their less reputable competitors. 
But empirical evidence is mixed for US and Eurobond corporate debt markets. Esho et al. 
(2002) confirm Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s (1994) predictions, whereas Santos and 
Tsatsaronis (2003) and Livingston and Miller (2000) find that high reputation investment 
banks charge lower fees. In addition to underwriter reputation, the type of underwriter may 
also matter. In Puri’s (1999) model, commercial banks, as lenders to firms, are better certifiers 
than investment banks. Therefore, commercial banks should charge higher fees than 
investment banks. However, for a sample of US corporate debt issues, Roten and Mullineaux 
(2002) find that commercial banks charge lower fees than investment banks. This may be 
explained by the fact that in their sample commercial banks have only just entered the market. 
  
Since keiretsu affiliation seems to have become disadvantageous, this might be reflected in 
affiliated firms paying higher fees. This result should hold even after controlling for 
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underwriter identity, issue risk and firm risk. In the next section we will discuss how we 
obtain our data and how we try to establish the link between keiretsu affiliation and fees.  
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data 
From the SDC New Issues Database Data we select all domestic non-convertible fixed-rate 
corporate bond issues in the April 1994-2002 period, which are 3248 issues in total. We start 
in April 1994 because before that time SDC does not report information on fees on Japanese 
domestic bond issues. We focus on domestic issues because foreign issues are not comparable 
in terms of fees, due to different market conditions such as regulation and investment banking 
competition. The same applies to bonds with option-like features. Furthermore, we exclude 
financial firms as they are in the same industry as the underwriters and could potentially 
underwrite themselves. After exclusion of financials, 2924 issues are left. Fees data are 
available for 2899 of these issues. Other issue data, such as coupon, maturity, and syndicate 
composition are also taken from the SDC New Issues Database. Additional issuer data, e.g. 
sales and capital structure ratios are obtained from Worldscope and Thomson One. For 2519 
issues we have all variables to be included in our regressions. 
 
For identifying keiretsu firms, Brown's (formerly Dodwell Marketing Consultants) 'Industrial 
Groupings in Japan' is the most widely used source7. It is used by for example Kang and 
Shivdasani (1999) and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998). We employ both the 1995 and 2001 
editions of Industrial Groupings in Japan, roughly corresponding with the beginning and end 
                                                
7
 Other sources are Keizai Chosa Kyokai's 'Keiretsu no Kenkyu', and Toyo Keizai's 'Kigyyo Keiretsu Soran', but 
these have not been published recently. According to Yafeh (2002), the cessation of their publication is another 
indication of the keiretsu’s demise. 
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of our sample period, to establish whether issuers belonged to a financial keiretsu. In the next 
section, we discuss descriptive statistics on keiretsu firms versus non-affiliated firms, fees, 
and on other issue and firm characteristics. 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
3.2.1 Keiretsu 
Table 1 shows the eight financial keiretsu and their sizes, both in number of firms and in 
sales. 
 
<Please insert Table 1 here> 
 
As the sales figures and number of affiliated firms show, the keiretsu are vast groups. They 
even grew in number of firms during the 1990s, which suggests an increasing economic 
significance. But that impression is only superficial and due to a trend of both starting new 
ventures and spinning off parts of firms that remain within the keiretsu. The sales figures 
show a different picture. Due to the previously mentioned disappointing operating 
performance, sales declined for all groups, in spite of the new ventures.  
 
The 189 keiretsu firms in our sample issued $149 billion in straight corporate bonds in the 
Japanese domestic market, which is 36% of the total issue amount in the sample. Keiretsu 
firms account for 47% of the 392 issuing firms and for just over half of the issues, which 
means that, on average, they issued slightly more bonds per firm than non-affiliated firms. An 
additional 13% of the firms belonged to a vertical keiretsu, making the percentage of firms 
belonging to either type of keiretsu 60%. This is more than the about 40 to 50% of listed 
manufacturing firms as reported by Weinstein and Yafeh (1995), but less than the 84% 
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reported by Nakatani (1984). Our classification is corroborated by Morck, Nakamura and 
Shivdasani’s (2000) more recent sample, where 51% of firms belong to a financial keiretsu, 
which is close to the 47% we find. 
 
Keiretsu affiliation is relatively stable among our sample firms. Out of the 189 issuers that 
were members in at least one period, 175 were so in both periods. Eight firms are not listed as 
members in the 1995 edition of Industrial Groupings in Japan, but do appear in the 2001 
edition. Three of them issued both before and during membership. Six firms appeared in the 
1995 edition of Industrial Groupings in Japan, but do not return in the 2001 edition. None of 
these firms issued after 1998. For the other 378 firms in the sample (both members and 
nonmembers) affiliation did not change. This membership stability seems inconsistent with 
the dissolution of cross-holdings that has been going on over the past decade8. Note however, 
that bond issuers are generally large firms, even compared to other keiretsu firms. Average 
keiretsu firm sales were around $1,5 billion in 1999 (Industrial Groupings in Japan, 2001), 
versus $13,8 billion for the average affiliated firm that issued in 1999. Given their importance 
to the keiretsu, it is hardly surprising that membership among large firms is very stable. In 
fact, we find that the vast majority (79% of issues) of keiretsu firms are classified 4-star by 
Industrial Groupings in Japan. A mere 11% of keiretsu firms have a 4-star classification, but 
4-star firms account for 79% of all issues by keiretsu firms. This 4-star classification means 
that group members have a majority of the voting rights in the firm, and that the firm is a 
member of the presidents’ council. Only the largest firms in the keiretsu are typically admitted 
to the presidents’ council. 
 
3.2.2 Fees 
                                                
8
 NLI Research Institute, 2002, Cross-shareholdings decline for the 11th straight year 
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Mean fees over the sample period are stable at just over 0.4% of proceeds, with the median at 
exactly 0.4%, and a standard deviation of 0.0085%. Given the sample mean issue size of $165 
million, the mean dollar amount of fees is 680,000. The 0.4% average is lower than previous 
studies find for Eurobond and US corporate debt markets (e.g. Kim et al., 2003 and Esho et 
al., 2002). The stability at just over 0.4% is misleading however, because when comparing 
fees for issues by affiliated with those by non-affiliated firms, a very different picture 
emerges, as Figure 1 shows. 
<Please insert Figure 1 here> 
 
During the first half of the sample period keiretsu firms enjoyed a slight discount in fees, but 
after 1998, this discount turned into a premium. Median fees for both affiliated and non-
affiliated fees are at the same level as mean fees. 
 
3.3.3 Issue characteristics 
Means of fees and of other issue characteristics are given in Table 2, for affiliated and non-
affiliated firm separately, and for each year of the sample period. 
 
<Please insert Table 2 here> 
 
Panel A shows the number of issues and the amount issued by affiliated and non-affiliated 
firms respectively. Issues by non-affiliated firm were typically larger, with a mean (median) 
value of $214 million ($151 million). The average mean (median) issue size of affiliated firms 
equals $117 million ($86 million). The total sample average is at $163 million. Affiliates and 
non-affiliates placed approximately the same amount of issues, with affiliated firm doing 
slightly more issues up until 1999, and non-affiliated firms slightly more issues in the last few 
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years. In general their numbers went up and down within the same proportions for most of the 
sample period, although the fall in issues by affiliated firms after 1998 is somewhat sharper 
than the fall in issues by non-affiliated firms.  
 
Similar to Figure 1, Panel B of Table 2 distinguishes fees for issues of both types of firms. 
Initially, fees are lower for affiliated firms, but then they become increasingly higher than fees 
for non-affiliated firms. The coupons they pay follow a similar, though weaker pattern, also 
with an initial advantage turning into a later disadvantage. Only the principal amount as a 
percentage of total assets lacks a clear pattern. For the other variables, the differences between 
affiliated and non-affiliated firms are stable over the sample period. That is, affiliated firms 
place smaller issues, their bonds have shorter maturities, and they hire less managers in their 
underwriting syndicate over the whole sample period. It seems both types of firms do 
different kinds of issues, but these differences existed over the whole period, so they do not 
provide an explanation for the change from a discount to a premium. 
 
3.3.4 Firm characteristics 
Next, we investigate firm characteristics. When looking at the industry distribution, we find 
that keiretsu firms are more often active in materials and consumer products, whereas non-
affiliated firms dominate in the retail and energy sectors. Table 3 gives means of (previous 
year's) financial statement items for those firms that issued in that particular year, again split 
by both types of firms 
 
<Please insert Table 3 here> 
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As to size, affiliated firms are smaller in terms of total assets for each sample year, but in 
terms of sales the picture is not very clear, with large swings in average sales. Affiliated firms 
have less fixed assets as a percentage of total assets, which is probably due to more non-
affiliated firms being in capital intensive industries, which also explains their consistently 
higher mean total assets. Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) find that keiretsu firms are both larger 
and more levered. However, they compare affiliated and non-affiliated firms among listed 
manufacturing firms, not specifically among bond issuers, which are likely to be larger and 
more levered than the average listed firm. Therefore, in our sample affiliated and non-
affiliated firms are more probably more comparable in terms of size and leverage. For most of 
the sample period both types of firms have similar debt ratios at around 65%. However, at 
similar total debt ratios, affiliated firms have lower long-term debt ratios than non-affiliated 
firms, indicating that affiliated firms have more short-term debt, which might reflect more 
bank debt or more trade credit from other affiliated firms.  
 
As found in previous research (e.g., Prowse, 1992, Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998, and Kang and 
Shivdasani, 1999), affiliated firms are less profitable than non-affiliated firms. We find 
significantly lower ROA and ROE, and also lower market-to-book ratios for most sample 
years. At the same time, keiretsu firms have higher earnings volatility during the whole 
sample period, which seems inconsistent with the idea of more stable cash flows (e.g. 
Nakatani, 1984, Khanna and Yafeh, 2005). But it is consistent with Beason (1998), who finds 
that the lower profitability of keiretsu firms is not offset by lower stock volatility. In spite of 
lower profitability, keiretsu firms in our sample are more liquid than non-affiliated firms, with 
significantly higher mean current ratios (and quick ratios) for each sample year. Overall levels 
of current ratios are low, with those of non-affiliated firms even on average being below one. 
This is in line with Hoshi, et al.’s (1989, 1991) findings for the 1980s that non-affiliated firms 
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are more liquidity constrained. Morck and Nakamura (1999) argue that affiliated firms have 
higher liquidity so as to avoid disciplining from banks. 
 
4. Methodology 
To establish the relationship between keiretsu, risk, and fees, we run OLS regressions on fees. 





















Underwriting fees are defined as a percentage of issue size, as in for example Gande et al. 
(1999) and Kim et al. (2003). Table 4 gives an overview of the independent variables to be 
used in the regressions, and the predicted signs of their coefficients.  
 
<Please insert Table 4 here> 
 
The affiliated dummy (FK) equals one if the firm belongs to a financial keiretsu according to 
the Industrial Groupings in Japan classification. This dummy is used to establish the relation 
between keiretsu and fees. We interact FK with the year dummies to account for changes in 
the influence of affiliation over time. Most other variables are meant to establish the link 
between fees and risk. Consistent with Altinkilic and Hansen (2000), we take both the size of 
the issue, LOG(PRINC), and the size of the issuing firm, LOG(SALES), into account. At a 
fixed firm size, larger issues are riskier than smaller ones. At a fixed issue size, issues by large 
firms are less risky than those by smaller firms. Therefore, we expect fees to relate positively 
to issue size (measured as the log of the principal amount) and negatively to firm size (as 
measured by the log of sales or the log of total assets). An obvious proxy for risk would be the 
bond’s credit rating. We do not use it here because in our sample only 14% of the issues are 
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rated by either S&P or Moody’s, and we do not have the ratings by Japanese agencies such as 
Mikuni, JCR, JBRI or NIS. We believe this is not problematic given that issue and firm 
characteristics are good predictors of rating in our sample9. Issue characteristics to be used as 
regressors on fees include issue size, but also the bond’s coupon (COUP), its maturity (MAT), 
and the type of underwriter (B4, BK). MAT, or Maturity is the number of years between the 
issue date and the planned redemption of the issue. Coupon (COUP) is the promised annual 
payment to be made to the bondholders, as a percentage of the issue size. Both are expected to 
be positively related to issue risk.  
 
We employ two dummies to control for the type of underwriter. First, there is a dummy (B4) 
that equals one if the lead manager of the underwriting syndicate is one of the Big Four firms 
(Nomura, Yamaichi, Nikko and Daiwa). These firms have traditionally been the most 
reputable underwriters in Japan. Since Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s (1994) model predicts that 
high reputation underwriters charge higher fees than their less reputable counterparts, we 
expect to find a positive sign for this dummy. Second, we use a dummy (BK) that equals one 
if the lead manager belongs to the same keiretsu as the issuer. It is difficult to attach a 
predicted sign to this dummy. On the one hand, a positive sign will result if keiretsu banks 
have a strong bargaining position via-à-vis their member firms and charge them higher fees. 
On the other hand, a negative sign will result if keiretsu firms benefit from their close banking 
relationships to obtain better deals and pay lower fees. However, such a negative sign could 
also result from keiretsu banks misusing their private information to underwrite less risky 
issues, as Hori and Osano (2002) suggest.  
                                                
9
 To test if firm and issue characteristics are good predictors of rating, we run ordered logit regressions on the 
266 rated issues in our sample. The results show that ratings increase significantly in firm size and fixed assets 
and decrease significantly in financial and operating risk. 
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Firm characteristics include the aforementioned affiliated dummy and firm size, but also the 
firm’s debt ratio (DR), variability in operating profits (SDEBTA5), fixed assets ratio (FA), 
current ratio (CR), return on assets (ROA), and market-to-book ratio (MB). These are all 
measured in the year preceding the issue. Financial risk, in the form of the debt ratio, is 
measured as the book value of assets as a percentage of total assets. For the variability of 
operating profits (SDEBTA5), or operational risk, we take the 5-year standard deviation of the 
ratio of EBIT and total assets. For both financial and operating risk we expect a positive 
relation with fees. The fixed assets ratio (book value of fixed assets as a percentage of total 
assets), current ratio (current assets by current liabilities), and return on assets (EBIT by 
beginning of year total assets), are all expected to be negatively associated with risk, and thus 
take a negative sign. The sign of the market-to-book ratio (market value of equity by book 
value of equity) is not clear upfront, as it is both associated with value (low risk) and growth 
options (high risk). 
 
Given the effects of competition on fees reported in several studies (e.g., Carow, 1999, Gande 
et al., 1999, and Santos and Tsatsaronis, 2003), and the reported fall in fees in the Japanese 
corporate bond market from 1991 to 1995 (Yasuda, 2001), it seems advisable to look at the 
change over time and include year dummies (Y95 for 1995, Y96 for 1996, etc.). As risk may 
also differ across industries, for example due to varying degrees of regulation, we also include 
industry dummies (IND1 through IND10). 
 
5. Results 
We run OLS regressions on fees using the independent variables discussed in section 4. To 
explicitly account for the possibility that the effect of keiretsu affiliation changes over time, 
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we not only use year dummies, but also interact these with the affiliation dummy. Table 5 
reports the results of the regressions. Model 1 is the basic model that includes all the likely 
explanatory variables discussed previously. Models 2 and 3 are robustness tests to model 1, 
where non-significant variables are left out (model 2) or the log of sales is replaced by the log 
of total assets (model 3). 
 
<Please insert Table 5 here> 
 
Table 5 indicates that fees indeed increase in risk, as reported by Kim et al. (2003) for the US. 
Fees increase in coupon, maturity, debt ratio, and earnings volatility, while they decrease in 
firm size (sales or total assets), liquidity, and, not significantly in a statistical sense, in fixed 
assets and profitability. The log of issue amount is the only variable that does not take the 
expected sign, nor is it statistically significant. Comparing models 2 and 3 with the basic 
model shows that the results are robust to model changes, also when replacing sales by total 
assets. Significance levels do not differ, and coefficients and R2 hardly change across the 
models. This is surprising since sales and total assets differ so markedly for the sample firms 
(see Table 3). Note however, that the economic role of size is not very substantial. The -0.005 
coefficient of log sales implies that even the largest firm ($200 billion in sales) enjoys merely 
a 0.02% discount (5% of average fees) vis à vis the smallest firm ($120 million in sales). The 
same discount results for firms that have a 1.3 percentage point (or 1.6 standard deviation) 
lower coupon than the sample mean coupon. Most other variables are in the same range of 
limited economic significance.  
 
Much more significant in an economic sense, are the interaction terms of keiretsu affiliation 
with the year dummies. They show that keiretsu firms pay a premium over non-affiliated 
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firms growing from 0.04% of proceeds (10% of average fees) in 1999 to 0.15% of proceeds 
(35% of average fees) in 2002. In 1998 the premium is already visible, but is statistically not 
significant. Apparently this effect grows stronger over the sample period as the consequences 
of the banking crisis become clear.  
 
The table also shows that Big Four investment bankers charge slightly higher fees, but in 
neither a statistically nor economically significant way. We also find that they typically 
underwrite larger issues, by larger firms with lower debt ratios and more fixed assets (not 
reported in tables). This is consistent with the model by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and 
with empirical findings by Esho et al. (2002) for US firms in the Eurobond market. There is a 
0.015 percentage point (4% of average fees) discount for keiretsu firms that hire an 
underwriter from their own keiretsu. Potentially, this could be due to bankers giving discounts 
to their keiretsu peers, or to banks using private information to select the better issues. The 
latter explanation would be consistent with the suggestion by Hori and Osano (2002) that 
banks misuse their private information for their self-interest at the expense of other banks in 
bond underwriting. Upon closer inspection, we find that in close to half of the issues by 
keiretsu firms, they hire a bank from their own keiretsu as their lead manager. The firms that 
do so are much smaller (average sales significantly smaller at the 5% level and median sales 
at the 10% level) than those that do not, which suggests they might be more likely to be 
subjected to bank hold-up. Moreover, these firms are more profitable than keiretsu firms that 
do not hire their keiretsu bank as underwriter (average ROA significantly larger at the 10% 
level, median ROA larger at the 5% level), and have a higher standard deviation of 
profitability (significant at the 1% level), suggesting there might indeed be some selection by 
banks going on.  
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As Table 5 shows that affiliated firms pay increasingly higher fees over the years, keiretsu 
firms could be subject to a different regime than affiliated firms. To test this, we run 
regressions on fees for affiliated and non-affiliated firms separately. Of course, the interaction 
terms of affiliation dummies with year dummies now disappear, and instead year dummies are 
reported independently. Table 6 shows the results of these regressions. 
 
<Please insert Table 6 here> 
 
Table 6 yields results similar to Table 5 in that it shows again that fees increase in issue and 
firm risk. Not all the issue and firm characteristics that proxy for risk have equally strong 
results as in Table 5, suggesting that both types of firms are indeed subject to different 
dynamics. Still, most significant variables have the same sign as in the regressions of Table 5. 
The signs for the sizes of issue and issuer do differ however, due to the problem noted by 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) that larger issues are usually done by larger firms. Another 
deviation from Table 5 is the market-to-book ratio, which takes a significantly positive sign 
for non-affiliated firms, and a significantly negative sign for keiretsu firms. Note however, 
that non-affiliated firms generally have higher market-to-book ratios than affiliated ones. For 
non-affiliated firms, overvaluation may thus be an issue, whereas a lack of growth options 
may be more of a concern with respect to keiretsu firms. More importantly, Table 6 confirms 
that the fee differentials from Figure 1 also hold after controlling for risk, and are even 
reinforced compared to Table 5. All year dummies in the affiliated regression have a positive 
sign, while all year dummies in the non-affiliated regression have a negative sign. 
Surprisingly, the coefficients are significant in 15 out of 16 cases. Thus, fees for issues by 
affiliated firms keep rising during the sample period, while those for issues by non-affiliated 
firms keep falling. As Figure 1 showed earlier, nominal fees on affiliated issues rose from 
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0.400% in 1994 to 0.525% in 2002, a rise of 0.125% (31% of 1994 fees). But from Table 6 
can be seen that, after correcting for risk, the rise amounts to 0.159%, or 40% of 1994 fees. In 
contrast to Table 5, Table 6 shows that a difference between both types of issuers has existed 
at least from the start of the sample period, and not just since 1998 or 1999, although an 
acceleration from then on can be discerned. This acceleration coincides with the substantial 
divestment of shares by keiretsu firms noted earlier. We also run regressions on fees for the 
917 issues by those firms with the strongest keiretsu ties, that is, the ones with a 4-star 
affiliation. These regressions (not reported in the tables) are similar to the one reported in 
table 6 for all affiliated firms, but with even larger coefficients for the year dummies. Thus the 
pattern stays intact but it shows that the effect increases with the intensity of affiliation. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
Over the past two decades, Japan has witnessed deregulation, increased access to public 
finance, and weaker banks. These events have weakened the keiretsu. In this paper we relate 
underwriting fees to keiretsu affiliation, controlling for risk. As in previous US research on 
fees (e.g. Kim et al., 2003), we find that fees increase in issue risk at the individual issue 
level. Increased competition among underwriters resulted in fees remaining stable over the 
sample period, in spite of rising issue risk. Thus, fees relatively declined, from which 
independent firms benefited. Affiliated firms however, had to pay an increasing premium. We 
interpret this finding as an indication that keiretsu membership turned from a benefit into a 
disadvantage. Bank-lead corporate groups may have been an efficient solution to missing 
markets for public finance, but they suffered when markets were deregulated. When the real 
estate and stock market bubble burst, the banks ran into trouble and they could no longer 
guarantee bail-out to its member firms. Moreover, their problems spilled over to the firms in 
their keiretsu. This happened in several ways, such as the substantial placements of 
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subordinated debt with affiliated firms (Horiuchi and Shimizu, 1998), and higher costs of 
capital (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998). Our results show that these spillovers also included 
higher fees on corporate bond issues. 
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Mitsubishi 29,8 204 30 178 271 43279 41732 
Mitsui 15,5 161 28 140 207 30865 27869 
Sumitomo 33,0 275 31 143 248 45300 39699 
Fuyo 24,6 231 23 140 221 37677 29811 
DKB 29,1 211 36 114 208 48055 34875 
IBJ 1,8 18 6 28 47 3196 3076 
Sanwa 15,7 174 29 112 193 35502 27633 
Tokai 1,1 14 8 38 60 11583 6886 
Double 
count** 1,5 15 2 3 2     
Sub-total 149,1 1273 189 890 1453 255457 211581 
Non-affiliated 266,7 1246 203         
Total 415,8 2519 392         
*Source: industrial Groupings In Japan, 1995, 2001, Brown and Company 
**Taiheiyo Cement belongs to both Mitsui and Fuyo; Mitsui OSK lines to both Mitsui and Sumitomo 
 
The table shows the eight corporate groups as identified by Brown & Co’s (formerly Dodwell Marketing Consultants) Industrial Groupings 
in Japan. Issue amount refers to the total proceeds from straight corporate bond issues by the groups’ firms in billions of US dollars. Number 
of firms in sample is the number of firms that were involved in these issues. 
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The figure shows fees on 2519 Japanese domestic bond issues included in our regressions, over the 1994-2002 period, both for firms 
belonging to one of the eight financial keiretsu groups identified in table 2 (affiliated firms) and for nongroup (non-affiliated) firms. Fees are 





Panel A: Number of issues and issue amounts 
 
    1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1994-2002 
Affiliated 22 122 150 187 342 170 111 93 76 1273 
Non-affiliated 46 86 136 159 306 131 130 114 138 1246 
Number of issues 
Total 68 208 286 346 648 301 241 207 214 2519 
Affiliated 6610 20826 19711 19582 33966 16958 10687 12769 8165 149272 
Non-affiliated 15575 27546 30238 27895 49358 28124 26215 29877 31878 266706 
Issue amount 
Total 22185 48372 49948 47476 83325 45082 36902 42645 40043 415978 
N 
  68 208 286 346 648 301 241 207 214 2519 
 
Panel B: Issue descriptives 
 
    1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1994-2002 
Affiliated 0,400 0,397 0,397 0,410 0,398 0,436 0,445 0,428 0,525 0,418 
Non-affiliated 0,437 0,427 0,417 0,438 0,408 0,394 0,398 0,371 0,378 0,406 
Fees 
Difference -0,038*** -0,030*** -0,021*** -0,028*** -0,011*** 0,042*** 0,047*** 0,057*** 0,147*** 0,012*** 
Affiliated 300,4 170,7 131,4 104,7 99,3 99,8 96,3 137,3 107,4 117,3 
Non-affiliated 338,6 320,3 222,3 175,4 161,3 214,7 201,7 262,1 231,0 214,0 
Principal amount 
Difference -38,2 -149,6*** -90,9*** -70,7*** -62,0*** -114,9*** 105,4*** -124,8*** -123,6*** -96,8*** 
Affiliated 2,12% 2,40% 2,16% 1,70% 1,62% 1,36% 2,27% 1,13% 1,51% 1,77% 
Non-affiliated 1,36% 3,02% 2,47% 2,26% 1,75% 1,64% 2,02% 1,44% 1,10% 1,88% 
Principal amount 
as a percentage of 
Total Assets 
Difference 0,75%* -0,62% -0,31% -0,56%** -0,13% -0,28% 0,25% -0,31% 0,41%*** -0,11%*** 
Affiliated 4,80 6,02 6,16 7,24 6,21 6,62 5,91 5,65 5,52 6,26 
Non-affiliated 7,75 8,18 7,65 9,50 8,10 8,16 7,44 7,28 7,63 8,03 
Maturity 
Difference -2,95** -2,16*** -1,49*** -2,27*** -1,88*** -1,53*** -1,53*** -1,63*** -2,11*** -1,77*** 
Affiliated 3,89 2,81 2,71 2,42 2,19 2,15 2,01 1,17 1,16 2,22 
Non-affiliated 4,19 2,90 2,79 2,48 2,12 1,86 1,71 1,11 1,07 2,09 
Coupon 
Difference -0,29** -0,08 -0,08 -0,06 0,07* 0,29*** 0,30*** 0,07 0,08 0,13*** 
Affiliated 21,8 17,8 16,2 12,5 8,0 4,3 5,0 5,9 5,7 9,8 
Non-affiliated 28,1 20,4 18,6 14,1 9,7 9,8 9,3 9,1 7,8 12,3 
Number of 
managers 
Difference -6,3*** -2,6** -2,4*** -1,5* -1,07*** -5,4*** -4,3*** -3,2*** -2,1*** -2,6*** 
N 
  68 208 286 346 648 301 241 207 214 2519 
 
The table shows descriptive statistics for the 2519 issues that are included in the regressions shown in Table 5. Panel A shows the number of 
issues and the total amount issued in millions of US dollars, both for firms belonging to one of the eight financial keiretsu groups identified 
in Table 2 (affiliated firms) and for nongroup (non-affiliated) firms. Panel B reports means per year and for the whole sample period, again 
both for group and for nongroup (non-affiliated) firms. Differences in means for issues of both types of firms are shown too, with 1, 2 or 3 
stars if they differ significantly at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Fees are gross fees paid to the underwriters as a percentage of 
the total proceeds of the issue. Principal amount equals total proceeds in millions of US dollars. Principal amount as a percentage of total 
assets are proceeds as a percentage of the total assets of the issuer at the end of the book year preceding the issue. Maturity signifies the 
number of years between the issue date and the promised redemption of the issue. Coupon is the promised annual payment to bondholders as 
a percentage of the bond’s face value. Number of managers refers to the number of investment banks involved in the underwriting syndicate 




Issuing firm characteristics 
 
    1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1994-
2002 
Affiliated 38432 31272 21540 15066 14613 37965 13802 22654 11732 20967 
Non-affiliated 17660 19168 17568 13741 18736 19673 17960 26048 22033 19013 
Sales 
Difference 20772** 12104* 3972 1325 -4123** 18292*** 4158 -3394 
-
10301*** 1954 
Affiliated 24750 19833 16970 14087 13675 24583 11903 18417 13027 16515 





















Affiliated 1,52 1,47 1,90 2,04 1,87 0,95 1,06 1,00 2,05 1,61 
Non-affiliated 2,93 2,56 2,49 2,62 2,23 2,03 2,04 2,14 2,61 2,35 
Return on Assets 
Difference -1,41*** -1,09*** -0,58*** -0,58*** -0,36*** -1,08*** -0,98*** -1,14*** -0,57 -0,74*** 
Affiliated 2,323 2,066 2,232 2,119 1,809 1,635 1,492 1,970 1,529 1,882 
Non-affiliated 2,426 2,234 2,211 2,448 1,943 1,974 1,975 2,123 1,874 2,090 
Market-to-book Ratio 
Difference -0,103 -0,168 0,021 -0,329** -0,134* -0,339*** -0,483*** -0,153 -0,345** -0,208*** 
Affiliated 67,89 64,84 66,29 64,44 61,28 73,44 65,70 66,77 59,39 65,09 
Non-affiliated 72,90 66,13 64,42 64,37 60,15 65,42 65,18 66,95 63,30 64,09 
Debt as a percentage of 
Total Assets 
Difference -5,02 -1,29 1,87 0,07 1,13 8,01*** 0,52 -0,18 -3,91 1,00 
Affiliated 53,74 51,05 52,85 50,03 46,03 61,84 53,32 54,23 46,45 51,41 
Non-affiliated 67,64 58,10 54,22 54,66 49,97 59,31 58,03 61,07 56,34 55,78 
Long-term Debt as a 
percentage of Total Assets 
Difference -13,89*** -7,05** -1,38 -4,64** -3,94** 2,53 -4,71 -6,84** -9,88*** -4,38*** 
Affiliated 1,15 1,22 1,21 1,14 1,18 1,10 1,17 1,11 1,06 1,16 
Non-affiliated 0,52 1,01 0,91 0,94 0,97 0,83 0,79 0,76 0,82 0,88 
Current Ratio 
Difference 0,62*** 0,21** 0,30*** 0,020*** 0,21*** 0,27*** 0,38*** 0,35*** 0,24*** 0,28*** 
Affiliated 0,0114 0,0171 0,0144 0,0109 0,0104 0,0115 0,0159 0,0170 0,0148 0,0130 
Non-affiliated 0,0080 0,0137 0,0106 0,0092 0,0106 0,0104 0,0118 0,0138 0,0143 0,0113 
Standard deviation of EBIT 
by Total Assets 
Difference 0,0034** 0,0034** 0,0038*** 0,0018** -0,0002 0,0011 0,0041*** 0,0033 0,0005 0,0016*** 
Affiliated 0,451 0,431 0,415 0,382 0,379 0,361 0,401 0,365 0,377 0,389 
Non-affiliated 0,796 0,613 0,537 0,576 0,537 0,636 0,654 0,691 0,614 0,602 
Fixed Assets as a percentage 
of Total Assets 
Difference -0,345*** -0,182*** -0,122*** -0,194*** -0,158*** -0,274*** -0,253*** -0,326*** -0,237*** -0,213*** 
N   68 208 286 346 648 301 241 207 214 2519 
 
The table shows descriptive statistics of the firms that made the 2519 issues that are included in the regressions shown in Table 5. Reported 
are means of issuer characteristics at the end of the book year preceding the issue, for those firms that actually made an issue. Means are 
reported separately for firms belonging to one of the eight financial keiretsu groups identified in Table 2 (affiliated firms) and for nongroup 
(non-affiliated) firms. Differences in means for issues of both types of firms are also shown, with 1, 2 or 3 stars if they differ significantly at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Sales and total assets are in millions of US dollars. Debt values are book values. Standard 





Variable Label Variable description Predicted relation 
with fees 
   
 
Log of principal amount LOG(PRINC) Logarithm of issue proceeds in millions of dollars + 
Log of sales LOG(SALES) Logarithm of the firm's previous year's sales in millions of dollars 
- 
Log of total assets LOG(TA) Logarithm of the firm's previous year's total assets in millions of 
dollars - 
Coupon COUP Promised annual coupon payments as a percentage of the principal 
amount + 
Maturity MAT The bond's time to maturity in years + 
Debt ratio DR Book value of debt as a percentage of the book value of total assets 
+ 
Standard deviation of 
EBIT by total assets 
SDEBTA5 5-year standard deviation of EBIT divided by total assets 
+ 
Fixed assets as a 
percentage of total assets 
FA Book value of fixed assets as a percentage of the book value of total 
assets 
- 
Current ratio CR Current assets divided by current liabilities 
- 
Return on assets ROA EBIT as a percentage of total assets 
- 
Market-to-book MB Market value of equity divided by the book value of equity ? 
Lead belongs to same 
keiretsu 
BK Dummy that equals 1 if the lead manager of the underwriting 
syndicate belongs to the same keiretsu as the issuer ? 
Big Four lead B4 Dummy that equals 1 if the lead manager of the underwriting 
syndicate is a Big Four firm + 
Affiliated FK Dummy that equals 1 if the issuing firm belongs to a financial 
keiretsu + 
 
The table shows the variables to be used in the regressions on fees and the predicted signs of their coefficients. The log of principal amount, 
coupon, maturity, debt ratio, standard deviation of EBIT by total assets, and the affiliated dummy are all associated with higher risk and 
expected to be positively related to fees. Big Four lead is a proxy for underwriter reputation, which is also associated with higher fees. The 
market-to-book ratio and the dummy for a lead manager belonging to the same keiretsu are variables that can go either way. The log of sales, 
fixed assets ratio, and current ratio are associated with lower risk, and thus have a negative sign. In addition to the variables mentioned in this 




OLS Regressions on fees 
Model 1 2 3 
Constant 0,3531*** 0,3465*** 0,3507*** 
  (10,40) (11,08) (9,93) 
Log of principal amount -0,0008 -0.0006 -0,0005 
  (-0,22) (-0,16) (-0,14) 
Log of sales -0,00521*** -0,0049***   
  (-3,52) (-3,45)   
Log of total assets     -0,0055*** 
      (-3,28) 
Coupon 0,0150*** 0,01546*** 0,0149*** 
  (3,24) (3,35) (3,17) 
Maturity 0,0070*** 0,0068*** 0,0070*** 
  (10,81) (10,73) (10,69) 
Debt ratio 0,0005*** 0,0005*** 0,0005*** 
  (3,87) (4,75) (4,17) 
Standard deviation of EBIT 0,6038** 0,6086** 0,5925** 
by total assets (2,42) (2,42) (2,56) 
Fixed assets as a percentage -0,0175 -0,0203* -0,0135 
of total assets (-1,61) (-1,86) (-1,26) 
Current ratio -0,0097*** -0,0098*** -0,0091*** 
  (-3,26) (-3,19) (3,10) 
Return on assets -0,00175   -0,0018 
  -(1,10)   (-1,14) 
Market-to-book -0,0011    -0,0010 
  (-0,83)   (-0,79) 
Lead belongs to same keiretsu -0.0141*** -0,0155*** -0,0140*** 
as the issuer (-2,97) (-3,57) (-2,94) 
Big four lead 0.004646   0,0048 
  (1,48)   (1,52) 
Keiretsu affiliated -0,01 -0,0076 -0,0108 
  (-0,88) (-0,67) (-0,96) 
1995*Keiretsu affiliated 0,0001 -0,0007 0,0012 
  (0,00) (-0,06) (0,11) 
1996*Keiretsu affiliated -0,0029 -0,0046 -0,0022 
  (-0,25) (-0,40) (-0,19) 
1997*Keiretsu affiliated 0,0011 -0,0002 0,002 
  (0,10) (-0,01) (0,18) 
1998*Keiretsu affiliated 0,0113 0,0093 0,0123 
  (1,02) (0,84) (1,12) 
1999*Keiretsu affiliated 0,0441*** 0,0431*** 0,0442*** 
  (3,27) (3,20) (3,30) 
2000*Keiretsu affiliated 0,0532*** 0,0524*** 0,0543*** 
  (3,17) (3,09) (3,25) 
2001*Keiretsu affiliated 0,0658*** 0,0651*** 0,0662*** 
  (4,96) (4,90) (5,03) 
2002*Keiretsu affiliated 0,1453*** 0,1438*** 0,1456*** 
  (5,95) (5,86) (5,98) 
        
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
        
R-squared 0,375 0,373 0,375 
Observations 2519 2519 2519 
 
OLS regressions with White heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. Dependent variable is fees paid to the underwriters as a percentage of 
proceeds. Principal amount equals total proceeds in millions of US dollars. Sales are reported sales in the year preceding the issue. The same 
applies to total assets, current ratio, return on assets, and market-to-book. Coupon is the promised annual payment to bondholders as a 
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percentage of the bond’s face value. Maturity signifies the number of years between the issue date and the promised redemption of the issue. 
Debt ratio is the ratio of book debt to total assets at the end of year preceding the issue. Standard deviation of EBIT by total assets is over a 5 
year period. Lead belongs to same keiretsu as the issuer is a dummy that equals 1 if the issuer and the lead manager of the underwriter 
syndicate belong to the same keiretsu. Big Four lead is a dummy that equals 1 if the lead manager is one of the Big Four Japanese investment 
banks (Nomura, Yamaichi, Nikko, or Daiwa). Affiliated is a dummy that equals 1 if the issuer belongs to one of the eight financial keiretsu. 
Issue in 1995 by affiliated firm is an interaction term of the affiliated dummy and the 1995 year dummy. Year dummies are also 
independently in the regressions, but are not reported. The same applies to industry dummies. 
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Table 6 
Separate OLS regressions for affiliated and non-affiliated firms 
 
Model Non-affiliated Affiliated Difference 
Constant 0,4972*** 0,2328*** 0,2643*** 
  (10,66)  (7,47) (-4,71) 
Log of principal amount -0,0104** 0,0133*** -0,0237*** 
  (-2,03) (3,50) (-3,71) 
Log of sales -0,0066*** -0,0032 -0,0034 
  (-4,05) (-1,37) (-1,19) 
Coupon -0,0014 0,0264*** -0,0279*** 
  (-0,18) (4,97) (-2,95) 
Maturity 0,0093*** 0,0058*** 0,0036** 
  (10,69) (5,20) (2,53) 
Debt ratio 0,0003** 0,0003 0,0000 
  (2,02) (1,51) (0,09) 
Standard deviation of EBIT 0,6282* 0,2058 0,4224 
by total assets (1,75) (1,16) (1,06) 
Fixed assets as a percentage -0,0533** 0,0026 -0,0559** 
of total assets (-2,24) (0,20) (-2,06) 
Current ratio -0,0083** -0,0149*** 0,0066 
  (-2,23) (-2,68) (0.99) 
Return on assets -0,0047** -0,0043 -0,0090*** 
  (-2,15) (2,46) (-3,22) 
Market-to-book 0,0035** -0,0060*** 0,0095*** 
  (2,52) (-2,51) (3,44) 
Lead belongs to same keiretsu   -0,0154*** 0,0154*** 
as the issuer   (-3,10) (-3,10) 
Big Four lead 0,0124*** -0,0027 0,0151** 
  (4,21) (-0,51) (2,53) 
1995 -0,0251* 0,0220** -0,0471*** 
  (-1,93) (2,04) (-2,79) 
1996 -0,0360*** 0,017 -0,0529*** 
  (-2,69) (1,44) (-2,98) 
1997 -0,0303* 0,0348*** -0,0651*** 
  (-1,69) (2,64) (-2,93) 
1998 -0,0494** 0,0326** -0,0820*** 
  (-2,48) (2,40) (-3,40) 
1999 -0,0595*** 0,0609*** -0,1204*** 
  (-2,77) (3,77) (-4,48) 
2000 -0,0513* 0,0793*** -0,1306*** 
  (-1,83) (4,42) (-3,93) 
2001 -0,0745*** 0,0960*** -0,1705*** 
  (-2,80) (5,27) (-5,29) 
2002 -0,0735*** 0,1587*** -0,2323*** 
  (-2,79) (5,47) (-5,92) 
        
Industry dummies Yes Yes   
        
R-squared 0,463 0,427   
Observations 1246 1273   
 
OLS regressions with White heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. Dependent variable is fees paid to the underwriters as a percentage of 
proceeds. Principal amount equals total proceeds in millions of US dollars. Sales are reported sales in the year preceding the issue. The same 
applies to current ratio, return on assets, and market-to-book. Coupon is the promised annual payment to bondholders as a percentage of the 
bond’s face value. Maturity signifies the number of years between the issue date and the promised redemption of the issue. Debt ratio is the 
ratio of book debt to total assets at the end of year preceding the issue. Standard deviation of EBIT by total assets is over a 5 year period. 
Lead belongs to same keiretsu as the issuer is a dummy that equals 1 if the issuer and the lead manager of the underwriter syndicate belong to 
the same keiretsu. Big Four lead is a dummy that equals 1 if the lead manager is one of the Big Four Japanese investment banks (Nomura, 
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Yamaichi, Nikko, or Daiwa). 1995, 1996, etc. are year dummies that equal 1 if the issue is done in that particular year. Industry dummies are 
independently in the regressions, but are not reported. 
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